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Abstract
We study the problem of estimating k-ary distributions under ε-local differential privacy. n
samples are distributed across users who send privatized versions of their sample to a central
server. All previously known sample optimal algorithms require linear (in k) communication
from each user in the high privacy regime (ε = O(1)), and run in time that grows as n ·k, which
can be prohibitive for large domain size k.
We propose Hadamard Response (HR), a local privatization scheme that requires no shared
randomness and is symmetric with respect to the users. Our scheme has order optimal sample
complexity for all ε, a communication of at most log k+2 bits per user, and nearly linear running
time of O˜(n+ k).
Our encoding and decoding are based on Hadamard matrices, and are simple to implement.
The statistical performance relies on the coding theoretic aspects of Hadamard matrices, ie, the
large Hamming distance between the rows. An efficient implementation of the algorithm using
the Fast Walsh-Hadamard transform gives the computational gains.
We compare our approach with Randomized Response (RR), RAPPOR, and subset-selection
mechanisms (SS), both theoretically, and experimentally. For k = 10000, our algorithm runs
about 100x faster than SS, and RAPPOR.
1 Introduction
Estimating the underlying probability distribution from data samples is a quintessential statistical
problem. Given samples from an unknown distribution p, the goal is to obtain an estimate pˆ of
p. The problem has a rich, and vast literature (see e.g. [6, 39, 17, 18], and many others), with
the primary goal of statistical efficiency, namely minimizing the sample complexity for estimation,
which is the first resource we consider.
1. Utility. What is the sample complexity of estimation?
In many applications, data contains sensitive information, and preserving the privacy of in-
dividuals is paramount. Without proper precautions, sensitive information can be inferred as
evidenced by well publicized data leaks over the past decade, including de-anonymization of public
health records in Massachusetts [41], de-anonymization of Netflix users [37] and de-anonymization
of individuals participating in the genome wide association study [29]. On the policy side, the
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EU General Data Protection Regulation are now in effect, putting strict regulations on the data
collection methods across the EU (visit http://www.eugdpr.org).
Private data release and computation on data has been studied in several fields, including
statistics, machine learning, database theory, algorithm design, and cryptography (See e.g., [45, 14,
22, 46, 23, 42, 13]). Differential Privacy (DP) [24] has emerged as one of the most popular notions
of privacy (see [24, 46, 26, 9, 36, 32], references therein, and the recent book [25]). DP has been
adopted by several companies including Google, and Apple [21, 27].
A particularly popular privacy setting is local differential privacy (LDP) [45, 23], where users
do not trust the data collector, and privatize their data before releasing. We study distribution
estimation under LDP. Distribution estimation with privacy is an important problem. For example,
understanding the drug usage habits of the entire population (the distribution) is crucial for policy
design. Understanding the internet traffic distribution is important for ad-placement. In both these
applications, preserving individual privacy is essential.
2. Privacy. How much information about a user is leaked by the scheme?
There are inherent trade-offs between utility and privacy. Sample privacy trade-offs have been
recently studied for various problems, including distribution estimation [23, 31, 47, 43, 20, 35].
However, two crucial resources have not been considered in private distribution estimation,
computation, and communication. In applications where the underlying dimensionality is high,
or the number of samples is large, it is imperative to have computationally efficient algorithms.
Internet companies collect information about user’s browsing history over a large number of users
and websites, and large departmental stores collect purchase statistics over a large number of users
and products. In these problems, algorithms with high computational overhead are prohibitive,
even if they have optimal sample complexity. There has been recent interest in computationally
efficient distribution estimation in the non-private setting (see e.g., [15, 1, 33, 12, 16, 40, 3]).
3. Computational Complexity. What is the running time of the algorithm?
In distributed applications, communication (both with and without privacy) is critical. For
example, a large fraction of internet traffic is on hand-held devices with limited uplink capacity
due to limited battery power, limited uplink bandwidth, or expensive data rates. Similarly, in
large scale distributed machine learning problems, communication from processors to the server is
the bottleneck since local computations are fast. Communication limited distributed distribution
estimation has been studied in the non-private setting(e.g., [48, 4, 19, 2, 28]).
In the context of private estimation tasks, the problem of finding the heavy hitters, and learning
properties under local differential privacy under the assumption of public randomness, where the
server can send communication to the clients to reduce communication from user end has received
much attention recently [8, 7, 5, 30, 44, 11]. However, these algorithms require shared randomness,
as well as asymmetric schemes, where each user can use a different privatization mechanism. [7]
uses a Hadamard transform, but they use it to form orthogonal basis and reduce storage, which is
different from us.
4. Communication Complexity. How many bits are communicated?
In this work, we consider discrete distribution estimation under the aforementioned four re-
sources. We provide the first algorithm that is simultaneously sample order optimal for any privacy
value, has logarithmic communication per symbol, and runs in linear time in the input and output
size.
1.1 Organization.
In Section 2 we describe the problem set-up, in Section 2.1 and 2.2 we describe prior privatization
2
schemes, and our results. In Section 3, we provide a family of ε-LDP privatization schemes. In
Section 4, we specialize and design schemes that are optimal in the most interesting regime of high
privacy. Finally in Section 5 we will describe how to extend these schemes to general ε.
2 Preliminaries
Local Differential Privacy (LDP). Suppose x is a private information that takes values in a set
X with k elements (wlog let X = [k]:={0, 1, . . . , k−1}). A privatization mechanism is a randomized
mapping Q from [k] to an output set Z (which can be arbitrary), that maps x ∈ X to z ∈ Z with
probability Q(z|x). The output z of this mapping, called the privatized sample, is then released.
Q is ε-locally differentially private (ε-LDP) [23] if for all x, x′ ∈ X ,
sup
z∈Z
Q(z|x)
Q(z|x′) ≤ e
ε. (1)
Small values of ε are more stringent and is the high privacy regime, and large values of ε is the low
privacy regime. When X and Z are both discrete, the mechanism Q is described by a stochastic
matrix of size |X | × |Z| whose (x, z)th entry is Q(z|x). Q is ε-LDP if the ratio of any two entries
in a column of this matrix is at most eε.
Randomness, and Symmetry. A scheme that requires shared/public randomness requires the
generation of shared randomness at the server, which needs to be communicated to the users. Sym-
metric schemes are those where each user uses the same privatization scheme [38]. In this paper,
we consider schemes that are symmetric and require no shared randomness. Other such schemes
include RAPPOR, Randomized Response, and subset selection methods, described later. We note
that the literature on heavy hitter estimation has mostly considered schemes with shared random-
ness [8, 7, 11], and it will be interesting to see if our methods can provide improved algorithms for
the heavy hitter problem.
LDP distribution estimation. Let ∆k =
{
p(0), . . . , p(k − 1) : p(x) ≥ 0,∑k−1x=0 p(x) = 1} be the
set of all distributions over [k]. Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent samples drawn from an unknown
p ∈ ∆k, where Xi is the private (sensitive) data with the ith user. Each user maps Xi through an
ε-LDP Q, to obtain Zi. The task at the server, upon observing the privatized samples Z1, . . . , Zn,
is to output pˆ : Zn → ∆k, an estimate of p. Let d : ∆k ×∆k → R+ be a distance measure between
distributions in ∆k. Private distribution estimation task is the following:
Given α > 0, ε > 0, d : ∆k×∆k → R, design an ε-LDP Q, and a corresponding
estimation pˆ, such that ∀p ∈ ∆k, with probability at least 0.9, d(pˆ, p) < α.
The sample complexity is the least n for which such an ε-LDP scheme Q, and a corresponding
pˆ exists. The communication complexity is the number of bits to send Zi to the server. The
computational complexity is the total time to estimate pˆ from Z1, . . . , Zn at the server and to
privatize Xi using Q at the users.
We will use ü1, and ü2 distance in this paper. For r ≥ 0, the ür distance between p, q ∈ ∆k
is ür(p, q):=(
∑
x |p(x)− q(x)|r)1/r. In non-private setting, the sample complexity of distribution
estimation under these distances is known even including precise constants [10, 34].
3
ε k-RR RAPPOR k -SS ε-HR
(0, 1) k3
ε2α2
k2
ε2α2
k2
ε2α2
k2
ε2α2
(1, log k) k3
e2εα2
k2
eε/2α2
k2
eεα2
k2
eεα2
(log k, 2 log k) k
α2
k2
eε/2α2
k
α2
k
α2
(2 log k,+∞) k
α2
k
α2
k
α2
k
α2
Table 1: Sample complexity, up to constant factors, under ü1 distance for the different methods.
The sample complexity under ü2 distance is exactly a factor k smaller in each cell above.
ε k-RR RAPPOR k -SS ε-HR
(0, 1) log k k k log k
(1, log k) log k k
eε/2
k
eε log k
(log k, 2 log k) log k k
eε/2
log k log k
(2 log k,+∞) log k log k log k log k
Table 2: Communication requirements for distribution estimation techniques.
2.1 The privatization mechanisms
We will now briefly describe RR, RAPPOR, the most popular ε-LDP schemes using no interaction
and public randomness. We will also mention SS, and our proposed HR. For a detailed description
of RAPPOR and SS, please refer to Section C.
k-Randomized Response (RR). The k-RR mechanism [45, 31] is an ε-LDP QRR with Z = X =
[k], such that
QRR(z|x) :=
{
eε
eε+k−1 if z = x,
1
eε+k−1 otherwise.
(2)
k-RAPPOR. The randomized aggregatable privacy-preserving ordinal response (RAPPOR) is an
ε-LDP mechanism which was proposed in [23, 27]. Its simplest implementation k-RAPPOR maps
X = [k] to Z = {0, 1}k. It first does a one hot encoding to the input x ∈ [k] to obtain y ∈ {0, 1}k,
such that yj = 1 for j = x, and yj = 0 for j Ó= x. The privatized output of k-RAPPOR is a k-bit
vector obtained by independently flipping each bit of y with probability 1
eε/2+1 .
Subset Selection techniques. [43, 47] propose an ε-LDP scheme that maps x ∈ [k] to subsets
of [k] of size çk/(eε + 1)è. The scheme is described in detail in Section C.
Hadamard Response. We propose Hadamard Response (HR), an ε-LDP scheme with Z = [K],
for some k ≤ K ≤ 4k. The algorithm is described in Section 4 for high privacy, and in Section 5
for general privacy.
2.2 Previous Results
To estimate distributions in ∆k to ü1 distance α under ε-LDP, the sample, communication and time
requirements of the various schemes are given in Table 1, 2 and 3 respectively..
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k-RR k-RAPPOR Subset selection ε-HR
n+ k n+ k + nk
eε/2
n+ k + nkeε n+ k
Table 3: Time bounds for distribution estimation. The running times are described in Section C.
These are upper bounds up to logarithmic factors.
The sample complexity is given in Table 1. The entries in green boxes are sample-order optimal,
namely there is a matching lower bound [47]. Note that RR is sample-optimal in the low privacy
regime (last two rows), and is highly sub-optimal in the high privacy regime (ε = O(1)). RAPPOR
is optimal for high-privacy, but sub-optimal for medium privacy. SS, and our proposed HR are
sample-order-optimal for all ε. The sample complexity arguments for RR, RAPPOR, and SS can
be found in [31, 47].
Table 2 describes the communication requirements of various schemes. However, it is not
clear how to measure the communication requirements, since for a given privatization scheme,
there might be communication protocols requiring fewer bits than others. For example, RAPPOR
is described as giving k bits as its output, but perhaps these k bits can be compressed further
requiring much smaller communication. We get around such concerns by observing that, once
the input distribution p and the privatization mechanism Q is fixed, the output distribution of
the privatized sample Z is fixed. By Shannon’s source coding theorem, to faithfully send Z to
the server requires at least H(Z) bits of communication. The entries in the table are derived by
considering the input distribution to be near uniform, and evaluating the entropy of the output
of the mechanisms. For RR, log k bits of communication follows from Z = [k]. Note that in this
paper all logarithms are in base 2. The communication requirements for RAPPOR, and SS are
derived in Section C (Theorems 9, and Theorem 10 respectively).
Table 3 describes the total running time lower bounds for faithfully implementing the known
schemes. The argument is that at the server, the computation complexity is at least the number
of bits that need to be read, which is the amount of communication from the users. If there are n
users, then n ·H(Z) serves as our time complexity bound, and these form the entries in the table.
2.3 Motivation and Our Results
Our work is motivated by the first three columns of the tables, which captures the apparent sample-
communication-computation trade-offs present in the existing schemes. We elaborate this point in
the most interesting regime of high privacy. For simplicity, fix ε = 1, and α = 0.1 (chosen
arbitrarily!), and treat them as fixed constants in this paragraph. In this setting, from Table 1,
note that the optimal sample complexity is Θ(k2), achieved by RAPPOR, and SS, while RR has a
sub-optimal sample complexity of Θ(k3). Now consider the communication requirements. Z = [k]
for RR, requiring only log k bits. A straight-forward computation shows that any input distribution
to the RAPPOR mechanism induces an output distribution over {0, 1}k with entropy at least Ω(k),
thus requiring Ω(k) bits to faithfully send the privatized samples to the server. SS also requires
Ω(k) bits in this regime. These are formally shown in Theorem 9 and Theorem 10. As for the
running time at the server end, a bound of Ω(k3) for all these three methods follows from the total
communication to the server (#samples × #bits per sample), which is a factor k larger than the
Θ(k2) optimal sample complexity bound.
Our main result is the following, which is formally stated in Theorem 2, and Theorem 7.
Theorem 1. We propose a simple algorithm for ε-LDP distribution estimation that for all param-
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eter regimes, is sample optimal, runs in near-linear time in the number of samples, and has only a
logarithmic communication complexity in the domain size, for both the ü1, and ü2 distance.
Going back to the high privacy regime, considered before, this shows that our scheme has a
running time of O˜(k2), which is nearly linear in the optimal sample complexity under ü1 distance.
3 A family of ε-LDP schemes
We first propose a general family of LDP schemes, and then carefully choose schemes from this
family that are sample-optimal, communication and computationally efficient for distribution esti-
mation.
The scheme involves the following steps:
1. Choose an integer K, and let the output alphabet be Z = [K].
2. Choose a positive integer s ≤ K.
3. For each x ∈ X = [k], pick Cx ⊆ [K] with |Cx| = s.
4. The privatization scheme from [k] to [K] is then given by:
Q(z|x) :=
{
eε
seε+K−s if z ∈ Cx,
1
seε+K−s if z ∈ Z \ Cx.
(3)
This scheme satisfies (1), and is ε-LDP. This privatization scheme chooses a set Cx for each x and
assigns the elements in Cx a higher probability than those not in Cx. We also note that RR is a
special case of this construction when K = k, s = 1, and Cx = {x}. We know from the last section
that RR is sub-optimal in the high privacy regime. Our general inspiration comes from coding
theory, and we select s, and Cx carefully in order to send more information across Q than RR.
In Section 4 we give an optimal scheme in the high privacy regime, and extend it to the general
case in Section 5
4 Optimal scheme for high privacy regime
Privatization scheme. If for two x, and x′, Cx = Cx′ , then we cannot tell them apart. Therefore,
the hope is that the farther apart Cx and Cx′ are, the easier it is to tell them apart. With this in
mind, we specify a particular choice of parameters for our scheme, which turns out to be sample-
optimal in the high privacy regime. In particular, our privatization scheme will satisfy the following:
An optimal privatization for high privacy
Choose K, and Cx’s such that (We will show in Section 4.1 how to satisfy these conditions.):
C1. K is between k and 2k, and s = K/2, namely for all x ∈ [k], |Cx| = K2 .
C2. For any x, x′ ∈ [k], and x Ó= x′, |∆(Cx, Cx′)| = |(Cx \ Cx′) ∪ (Cx′ \ Cx)| = K2 .
Use (3) for privatization.
Performance. We will show that for ε = O(1), this privatization is sample-order-optimal, namely
there is a corresponding estimator pˆ : [K]n → ∆k that is sample-optimal. Before describing the
estimation procedure, we provide the statistical guarantees.
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Theorem 2. For any privatization scheme satisfying C1, C2, there is a corresponding estimation
scheme pˆ : [K]n → ∆k, such that
E
[
ü22(pˆ, p)
]
≤ 4k(e
ε + 1)2
n(eε − 1)2 , and E [ü1(pˆ, p)] ≤
√
4k2(eε + 1)2
n(eε − 1)2 . (4)
The sample optimality, and small communication for high privacy is an immediate corollary.
Corollary 3. When ε = O(1), the sample complexity of this scheme for estimation to ü1 distance
α is O(k2/ε2α2) samples, and for ü22 distance is O(k/ε2α2). Further, the communication from each
user is at most log(k) + 1 bits. This is sample-optimal for ε = O(1) for both ü1 (Table 1) and ü22
(see [47]).
Proof. Applying Markov’s inequality in Theorem 2, and substituting eε + 1 = Θ(1), and eε − 1 =
Θ(ε) when ε = O(1) gives the sample complexity bounds. The communication bounds are from
logK ≤ log(k) + 1.
Estimation. Suppose QK,ε is an ε-LDP scheme satisfying C1, and C2. For an input distribution
p over [k], let p(Cx) be the probability that the privatized sample Z ∈ Cx. Using |Cx| = K/2, and
C2, it follows that |Cx \ Cx′ | = K/4, and |Cx ∩ Cx′ | = K/4. Therefore,
p(Cx) = p(x)
∑
z∈Cx
QK,ε(z|x)
+ ∑
x′ Ó=x
p(x′)
 ∑
z∈Cx\Cx′
QK,ε
(
z|x′)+ ∑
z∈Cx∩Cx′
QK,ε
(
z|x′)

= p(x)|Cx| e
ε
(seε +K − s) +
∑
x′ Ó=x
p(x′)
( |Cx \ Cx′ | · 1
seε +K − s +
|Cx ∩ Cx′ | · eε
seε +K − s
)
(5)
= 12 +
eε − 1
2(eε + 1)p(x), (6)
where (5) follows from (3), and (6) by plugging s = K/2, and from C2. We can rewrite this as
p(x) = 2(e
ε + 1)
eε − 1
(
p(Cx)− 12
)
. (7)
This forms the basis of our estimation. From the privatized samples, we estimate of p(Cx), and
from that we estimate p. The entire scheme is given below.
An optimal distribution estimation scheme for high privacy
Input: k, ε, privatized samples Z1, . . . , Zn
1. For each x ∈ [k], estimate p(Cx) with its empirical probability:
p̂(Cx) :=
n∑
j=1
I {Zj ∈ Cx}
n
. (8)
2. Estimate pˆ as:
pˆ(x) := 2(e
ε + 1)
eε − 1
(
p̂(Cx)− 12
)
. (9)
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Proof of Theorem 2.1 Let p(C), p̂(C), be the vector of probabilities of p(Cx)’s and p̂(Cx)’s
respectively. From (7) and (9),
E
[
ü22(pˆ, p)
]
= 4(e
ε + 1)2
(eε − 1)2 E
[
ü22(p̂(C), p(C))
]
.
From (8), E
[
p̂(Cx)
]
= E [I {Zj ∈ Cx}] = p(Cx). Therefore,
E
[
ü22(p̂(C), p(C))
]
= E
∑
x∈[k]
(p̂(Cx)− p(Cx))2
 = ∑
x∈[k]
E
[
(p̂(Cx)− p(Cx))2
]
=
∑
x∈[k]
Var(p̂(Cx)).
By the independence of Zi’s, p̂(Cx) is the average of n independent Bernoulli random variables each
with expectation p(Cx). Hence,∑
x∈[k]
Var(p̂(Cx)) =
∑
x∈[k]
1
n
· p(Cx)(1− p(Cx)) ≤ 1
n
∑
x∈[k]
p(Cx) ≤ k
n
.
Plugging this bound in the previous expression gives the bound on ü22 distance of the theorem.
E
[
ü22(pˆ, p)
]
≤ 4k(e
ε + 1)2
n(eε − 1)2 . (10)
Using k · ü22(pˆ, p) ≥ ü1(pˆ, p)2 with (10) gives the desired bound on E [ü1(pˆ, p)].
4.1 Computational complexity and Hadamard matrices.
We showed the sample, and communication complexity guarantees. However, two questions are
still unanswered:
• How to choose K, and design Cx’s that satisfy C1, C2?
• What is the time complexity of privatization and estimation?
We now address these questions. We start with the computational requirements of the proposed
scheme, assuming C1,C2.
Computation at users. Given Cx’s, each user needs to implement (3). This requires uniform
sampling from Cx’s, as well as from [K] \Cx. We will design schemes to do this in time O(logK).
Computation at the server. The server needs to implement (8) and (9). Note that (9) can
be implemented in time O(k) after implementing (8). However, a straightforward implementation
of (8) requires n · k time, since for each x we iterate over all the samples, giving running time
of O(n · k). In particular, in the high privacy regime (say with ε = 1, and α = 0.1) the sample
complexity is O(k2) but the time requirement will be O(k3). We now show how to design a
privatization to satisfy C1, C2, and for which we can implement (8) in time only O˜(n+ k).
Hadamard Response (HR) for high privacy. Suppose K is a power of two, and let HK ∈
{±1}K×K be the Hadamard matrix of size K×K designed by the well known Sylvester’s construc-
tion as follows. Let H1 = [1], and for m = 2j , for j ≥ 1, then
Hm :=
Hm/2 Hm/2
Hm/2 −Hm/2
 .
1A technicality here is that pˆ(x)’s can be negative, but we can project pˆ onto the simplex with the same order
performance. We therefore only analyze the performance of pˆ described in (9).
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Some standard properties of Hadamard matrices that we use are the following:
(i) The number of +1’s in each row except the first is K/2,
(ii) Any two rows agree (and disagree) on exactly K/2 locations,
(iii) Vector multiplication with HK is possible in time O(K logK) with Fast Walsh Hadamard
transform,
(iv) We can uniformly sample from the +1’s (and the −1’s) in any row in time O(logK).
We now describe the parameters for the privacy mechanism:
1. Choice of K: Let K = 2çlog2(k+1)è ≥ k + 1, the smallest power of 2 larger than k. To satisfy
C1, we will choose s = K/2.
2. Choice of Cx’s: Map the symbols [k] = {0, . . . , k− 1} to rows of HK as follows: map 0 to the
second row, 1 to the third row, and so on. In other words, x is mapped to row x+ 1. Given
any x, we choose Cx ⊂ [K] to be the column indices with a ‘+1’ in the (x+ 1)th row of HK .
By Property (i) and (ii) of HK , both C1, and C2 are satisfied. This implies a privatization scheme
with optimal sample and communication complexity in the high privacy regime.
Fast computation with HR. By Property (iv), we can efficiently implement the privatiza-
tion scheme at the users. We will now provide an efficient implementation of (8). Let q =
(q(0), . . . , q(K−1)) be the vector of the empirical distribution of Z1, . . . , Zn over [K] = {0, . . . ,K−
1}, namely
q(z) =
n∑
i=1
I {Zi = z}
n
.
We can compute q in linear time with a single pass over Z1, . . . , Zn. Consider the matrix vector
product c = HK · q. For x ∈ [k], the (x + 1)th entry of HK · q is ∑K−1z=0 HK(x + 1, z) · q(z). Now
note that the +1’s in the (x+ 1)th column correspond to Cx by construction, therefore
K−1∑
z=0
HK(x+ 1, z) · q(z) =
∑
z∈Cx
q(z)−
∑
z∈[K]\Cx
q(z) = 2p̂(Cx)− 1 (11)
=
(
eε − 1
eε + 1
)
pˆ(x), (12)
where (11) follows from observing that ∑z∈Cx q(z) = p̂(Cx) from (8), and (12) follows from (9).
Therefore the estimator pˆ is simply entries of a Hadamard vector product, appropriately normalized.
By property (iii), this can be done in time O(K logK) = O(k log k). This computational advantage
is captured in the following theorem:
Theorem 4. HR is an ε-LDP mechanism satisfying Theorem 2 that has a running time O˜(n+ k).
5 General privacy regimes
Recall that RR is optimal for the low-privacy regime, which corresponds to s = 1. In the high
privacy regime, we used s = O(k). For general ε’s, we propose schemes within the framework of
Section 3 that interpolate between HR and RR, while achieving the optimal sample complexity for
every ε. In general, our choice of s will be close to max{k/eε, 1} as we will see below.
Privatization scheme in general privacy regime. We describe how we choose K, s, and Cx’s,
in the scheme from Section 3.
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We will consider block-structured matrices that interpolate between Hadamard matrices in high
privacy regime and the identity matrix (corresponding to RR) in the low privacy regime.
Definition 5. Let B and b be powers of two, and let K = B · b. A (B, b)-“reduced” Hadamard
matrix is a K ×K matrix with entries in {−1,+1} defined as:
HbK :=

Hb Pb . . . Pb
Pb Hb . . . Pb
...
... . . .
...
Pb Pb . . . Hb

,
where Hb is the b× b Hadamard matrix, and Pb is the b× b matrix with all entries ‘−1’. Note that
there are B occurrences of Hb along the diagonal.
1. Choice of K: Let B be the largest power of 2 less than min{eε, 2k}, and b is the smallest
power of 2 larger than kB + 1, i.e.,
B := 2çlog2min{eε,2k}è−1, b := 2çlog2(
k
B
+1)è.
Let K = B · b. A simple computation shows that K ≤ 4k, implying that the communication
from the users is at most log k + 2 bits.
2. We will choose s = b/2.
3. Choice of Cx: From Property (i) of Hadamard matrices in the last section, the number of
+1’s in the rows of HbK corresponding to the first rows of the embedded Hb’s is b, and for all
other rows it is b/2. Similar to the high privacy regime, we map each x to a distinct row rx
of HbK with b/2 entries as +1’s. A simple way to do as before would be to map 0 ∈ [k] to
the second row of HbK , and x ∈ [k] is assigned to row rx−1 + 1, if it is not the first row of an
embedded Hb, otherwise we assign it to rx−1 + 2. As before, let Cx be the column’s with a
+1 in the rxth row of HbK .
4. The privatization mechanism then applies (3), which can be done in time O(log k) at each
user by Property (iv) of Hadamard matrices.
Estimation scheme in general privacy regime. In the high privacy regime, we related p(Cx)
to p(x) in (7). We will do the same here, however, because of the block-structure, the inputs that
map to different blocks behave differently. Let Si ⊆ [K] be the columns of the ith embedded Hb
block. Similar to p(Cx), let p(Si) to be the probability that the output z ∈ Si, when the input
distribution is p. In other words,
Si :=
{
z|åz
b
æ = i
}
, p(Si) :=
∑
x
p(x)
∑
z∈Si
Q(z|x)
.
Similar to (7), the following lemma relates p(Cx), p(Si), and p(x). It is proved in Section A.
Lemma 6. For the input distribution p, and x ∈ [k] such that rx is in the ith embedded Hb,
p(Cx)− 12p(Si) =
eε − 1
2(2B − 1 + eε)p(x). (13)
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With this lemma, our estimation algorithm is the following:
Distribution estimation for general privacy
Input: k, ε, privatized samples Z1, . . . , Zn
1. For each x ∈ [k], estimate p(Cx) with its empirical probability:
p̂(Cx) :=
n∑
j=1
I {Zj ∈ Cx}
n
. (14)
2. For each i ∈ B, estimate p(Si) with its empirical probability:
p̂(Si) :=
n∑
j=1
I {Zj ∈ Si}
n
. (15)
3. The estimator pˆ is then given by
pˆ(x) = 2(2B − 1 + e
ε)
eε − 1 ·
(
p̂(Cx)− 12 p̂(Si)
)
. (16)
5.1 Performance
Our main performance bound on this scheme is given below. The analysis is similar to the high
privacy regime and is given in Section B.
Theorem 7. For all values of ε, and k, and the privatization scheme above, there is an estimate
pˆ such that
E
[
ü22(pˆ, p)
]
≤ 36(k + (e
ε − 1)b)eε
n(eε − 1)2 , E [ü1(pˆ, p)] ≤
√
36k
n
(k + (eε − 1)b)eε
(eε − 1)2 .
The running time is O˜(n+ k), and communication is at most log k + 2 bits.
Corollary 8. Plugging the values of b in different regimes we obtain
E [ü1(pˆ, p)] ≤

O
(√
k2
nε2
)
, if ε < 1,
O
(√
k2
neε
)
, if 1 < ε < log k,
O
(√
k
n
)
, if ε > log k.
Applying Markov’s inequality, we obtain all the sample complexity bounds for HR described in the
last column of Table 1.
6 Experiments.
We experimentally compare our algorithm with RR, RAPPOR and SS. We set k ∈ {100, 1000, 5000, 10000},
n ∈ {50000, 100000, 150000, ..., 1000000}, and ε ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. We consider ge-
ometric distributions Geo(λ), where p(i) ∝ (1 − λ)iλ, Zipf distributions Zipf(k, t) where p(i) ∝
(i+ 1)−t, two-step distributions, and uniform distributions. For every setting of (k, p, n, ε), and
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for each scheme, we simulate 30 runs, and compute the averaged ü1 error, and averaged de-
coding time at the server. Our code and data for the experiments can be found at https:
//github.com/jlyx417353617/hadamard_response.
In a nutshell, we observe that in each regime, the statistical performance of HR is comparable
to the best possible. Moreover, the decoding time of HR is similar to that of RR. In comparison
to RAPPOR and SS, our running times can be orders of magnitude smaller, particularly for large
k, and small ε. We remark that we implement RAPPOR, and SS such that their running time is
almost linear in the time needed to read the already compressed communication from the users.
We describe some of our experimental results here. Figure 1 plots the ü1 error for estimating
geometric distribution for k = 1000. Note that for ε = 0.5, and ε = 7, our performance matches
with the best schemes. In all the plots SS has the best statistical performance, however that can
come at the cost of higher communication, and computation. Figures 2 captures similar statistical
performance results for the uniform distribution for k = 1000. For larger k such as k = 10000, the
performance is shown in figure 3.
The running time of our algorithm is theoretically a factor k/ log k smaller than RAPPOR and
subset selection. This is evident from the plots which show that for large k the running times of
RAPPOR and SS are orders of magnitude more than HR, and RR.
Figure 4 shows the decoding time for the algorithms when k = 100, 1000, 5000, 10000 and ε = 1.
It can be seen that our algorithm is orders of magnitudes faster in comparison to k-RAPPOR and
k-SS. The gap in computation gets larger when k is larger, which is consistent with our theoretical
analysis. For example, for k = 10000, our algorithm runs 100x faster than SS, and RAPPOR.
To compare the decoding time more fairly, we use a fast implementation for RAPPOR and SS
in the middle and low privacy regime. We encode the k bit vector into a list of locations where
there is a ‘+1’. The decoder uses this list to compute the histogram. The time requirement is
O( nk1+eε ) and O(
nk
1+eε/2 ) for SS and k-RAPPOR respectively in expectation (a naive implementation
takes O(nk) time). This is the best anyone can do to faithfully implement the algorithms.
Figure 5 shows the decoding time in middle privacy regime. We use fast implementation for
RAPPOR and SS here. We can see our proposed algorithm is still saving a lot of time comparing
to k-RAPPOR and SS. For low privacy regime, essentially everything breaks down to Randomized
Response, so we won’t show the plots for the time comparison in this regime.
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Figure 1: ü1-error comparison between four algorithms k = 1000 and p ∼ Geo(0.8)
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Figure 2: ü1-error comparison between four algorithms k = 1000 and p ∼ U [k]
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Figure 3: ü1-error comparison between four algorithms k = 10000 and p ∼ Geo(0.8)
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Figure 4: Decoding time comparison between four algorithms for ε = 1 and p ∼ Geo(0.8) and different
values of k
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Figure 5: Decoding time comparison between four algorithms in middle privacy regime and p ∼ Geo(0.8).
Note that the decoding times are in logarithmic scale.
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A Proof of Lemma 6
Let Ti = {x ∈ [k] | rx is in the ith Hb block} be the set of symbols such that rx is in the ith Hb
block. From the description of rx, we obtain
Ti :=
{
x | å x
b− 1æ = i
}
, p(Ti) :=
∑
x∈Ti
p(x) and,
∑
i
p(Ti) = 1. (17)
We will prove that
p(Cx) =
1
2B − 1 + eε +
eε − 1
2(2B − 1 + eε)p(x) +
eε − 1
2(2B − 1 + eε)p(Ti), and (18)
p(Si) =
eε − 1
2B − 1 + eε p(Ti) +
2
2B − 1 + eε (19)
Then note that (18)−12 (19) gives Lemma 6.
Proof of (18). Recall that for any x,
p(Cx) =
∑
x′
p(x′)Q(Z ∈ Cx|X = x′). (20)
For any x, x′ ∈ [k], by (3) and s = b/2,
Q(Z ∈ Cx|X = x′) = 2e
ε
beε + 2K − b × |Cx ∩ Cx′ |+
2
beε + 2K − b × |Cx \ Cx′ |. (21)
There are three cases:
• x′ = x. In this case, |Cx ∩ Cx′ | = s = b/2, and |Cx \ Cx′ | = ∅.
• x′ ∈ Tå x
b−1 æ \ {x}: When this happens, then by the Property (ii) of Hadamard matrices,
|Cx ∩ Cx′ | = s/2 = b/4, and |Cx \ Cx′ | = s/2 = b/4.
• x′ /∈ Tå x
b−1 æ: The symbols x
′ /∈ Tå x
b−1 æ satisfy |Cx ∩ Cx′ | = ∅, and |Cx \ Cx′ | = b/2.
Plugging these in (21), and using (20) with K = Bb, we obtain
p(Cx) = p(x)
eε
2B − 1 + eε + p
(
Tå x
b−1 æ \ {x}
) eε + 1
2(2B − 1 + eε) + p
(
[k] \ Tå x
b−1 æ
) 1
2B − 1 + eε
= e
ε · p(x)
2B − 1 + eε +
eε + 1
2(2B − 1 + eε)
(
p
(
Tå x
b−1 æ
)
− p(x)
)
+ 12B − 1 + eε
(
1− p
(
Tå x
b−1 æ
))
= 12B − 1 + eε +
eε − 1
2(2B − 1 + eε)p(x) +
eε − 1
2(2B − 1 + eε)p
(
Tå x
b−1 æ
)
.
Proof of (19). Recall that p(Si) is the probability that the output is in Si, when input distribution
is p. Note that for x ∈ Ti, Cx ⊂ Si, hence |Si ∩ Cx| = |Cx| = b/2 and Cx \ Si = ∅. For x /∈ Ti,
Cx ∩ Si = ∅ and |Cx \ Si| = |Cx| = b/2. Again using (21) and replacing Cx with Si, we obtain
p(Si) =
eε + 1
2B − 1 + eε p(Ti) +
2
2B − 1 + eε (1− p(Ti)).
Rearranging the terms gives (19).
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B Proof of sample complexity bounds (Theorem 7)
We will prove Theorem 7 from Lemma 6. The proof follows the general approach used in Section 4
for the high privacy regime. Subtracting (13) of Lemma 6 from (16), we obtain
pˆ(x)− p(x) = 2(2B − 1 + e
ε)
eε − 1 ·
((
p̂(Cx)− p(Cx)
)
− 12
(
p̂(Si)− p(Si)
))
, (22)
where recall that Si is the output columns corresponding to the rxth block. Squaring both sides,
and observing that for any reals (a− b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2), we obtain
(pˆ(x)− p(x))2 ≤ 8(2B − 1 + e
ε)2
(eε − 1)2 ·
((
p̂(Cx)− p(Cx)
)2
+ 14
(
p̂(Si)− p(Si)
)2)
. (23)
Now recall that p̂(Cx) is average of independent Bernoulli’s with mean p(Cx), and p̂(Si) is the
average of independent Bernoulli’s with mean p(Si). Therefore,
E
[(
p̂(Cx)− p(Cx)
)2]
= 1
n
p(Cx)(1− p(Cx)) < 1
n
p(Cx), (24)
and
E
[(
p̂(Si)− p(Si)
)2]
= 1
n
p(Si)(1− p(Si)) < 1
n
p(Si). (25)
Summing over x in (18) and using (17), we obtain
∑
x
E
[(
p̂(Cx)− p(Cx)
)2]
<
1
n
∑
x
( 1
2B − 1 + eε +
eε − 1
2(2B − 1 + eε)p(x) +
eε − 1
2(2B − 1 + eε)p(Ti)
)
≤ 1
n
(
k
2B − 1 + eε +
eε − 1
2(2B − 1 + eε) +
b(eε − 1)
2(2B − 1 + eε)
)
. (26)
where the last inequality follows since each Ti is of size at most b, and
∑
i p(Ti) = 1, implying that∑
x p(Ti) ≤ b. Similarly, summing over x in (19),
∑
x
p(Si) ≤ b(e
ε − 1)
2B − 1 + eε +
2k
2B − 1 + eε . (27)
Summing over x in (23) and taking the expectations, and plugging the bounds above with the
observation that B < eε by design, we obtain the bound on E
[
ü2(pˆ, p)2
]
, proving the theorem.
E
[
ü22(pˆ, p)
]
≤ 1
n
8(2B − 1 + eε)2
(eε − 1)2
((2k + (b+ 1)(eε − 1)
2(2B − 1 + eε)
)
+ 14
(4k + 2b(eε − 1)
2(2B − 1 + eε)
))
= 1
n
4(2B − 1 + eε)
(eε − 1)2
(
3k + (32b+ 1)(e
ε − 1)
)
. (28)
≤ 36e
ε(k + b(eε − 1))
n(eε − 1)2 .
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C Description and performance of RAPPOR and SS
C.1 k-RAPPOR.
Recall from Section 2.2 the privatization mechanism of RAPPOR. For input x ∈ [k], y ∈ {0, 1}k is
such that yj = 1 for j = x, and yj = 0 for j Ó= x. The privatized output of RAPPOR is a k bit
vector z such that
Q(zj = yj) =
eε/2
eε/2 + 1
, and Q(zj = 1− yj) = 1
eε/2 + 1
.
[31] analyze the sample complexity of RAPPOR (See Table 1). We will consider the communication
requirements now in Theorem 9.
Communication. The output of k-RAPPOR mechanism is described above with k bits. We
now consider the communication requirements for any algorithm that faithfully sends the output
of RAPPOR privatization to the server. By Shannon’s coding theorem, any algorithm to do this
requires at least H(Z|p) bits even if it knows the distribution p.
Theorem 9. The entropy Z of the output of RAPPOR for any input distribution satisfies
H(Z) ≥
Ω(k) when ε < 1,Ω( k
eε/2
)
when 1 < ε < 2 log k,
and for the uniform input distribution H(Z) ≥ log k when ε > 2 log k.
Proof. For any input x, the outputs zj for j Ó= x are all i.i.d. B( 11+eε/2 ) random variables, where
B(r) is a Bernoulli random variable with bias r. Therefore the entropy of the output is at least
(k− 1) ·h(1/(1 + eε/2)), where h(r) := −r log r− (1− r) log(1− r) is the entropy of a B(r) random
variable. Note that h(r) > −r log r. Therefore, (k − 1)h(1/(1 + eε/2)) > (k − 1) log(1+eε/2)1+eε/2 . For
ε < 1 this bound reduces to Ω(k), and for any ε < 2 log k ignoring the logarithmic term gives the
theorem. For the uniform input distribution, when ε > 2 log k, we note that the output is nearly
uniform on the basis vectors, giving the bound.
C.2 Subset Selection Approaches.
The papers [43, 47] propose sample optimal privacy mechanisms for all ranges of ε. The mechanism
is as follows. The output is again k bits, and suppose d = çk/(eε + 1)è. The output is Z = Zk,d,
where Zk,d is the set of all binary strings with Hamming weight d. For an i ∈ [k], let Z ik,d be the
elements in Zk,d with 1 in the ith location. Then note that |Zk,d| =
(k
d
)
, and
∣∣∣Z ik,d∣∣∣ = (k−1d−1). Then,
for Z1 . . . Zk ∈ Zk,d,
Q(Z1 . . . Zk|i) =

eε
(k−1d−1)eε+(k−1d ),
for Z1 . . . Zk ∈ Zik,d,
1
(k−1d−1)eε+(k−1d ),
for Z1 . . . Zk ∈ Zk,d \ Z ik,d.
Communication. We can characterize the communication complexity by computing the entropy
of the output distributions of the mechanism. The computations are similar to the last section, we
simply state the entropy bounds that imply the communication bounds.
Suppose the underlying distribution is uniform. In this case, the output distribution is uniform
among all possible strings of weight equal to d. Therefore the entropy of the output string is
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identical to log
(k
d
)
, which is the optimal communication complexity per user. Note that for small
ε this communication is strictly undesirable!
Theorem 10. The entropy Z of the output of SS for any input distribution satisfies
H(Z) ≥
Ω(k) when ε < 1,Ω( keε) when 1 < ε < log k,
and for the uniform input distribution H(Z) ≥ log k when ε > log k.
While the final mechanism is sample order optimal for all values of ε, the communication cost
for each user depends critically on the value of ε. Table 2 characterizes the communication cost for
all three well known mechanisms and our proposed method.
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